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LEGAL STORIES, CHANGE, AND INCENTIVESREINFORCING THE LAW OF THE FATHER*
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article addresses the problems for women and children latent in
recent suggestions to use the law to create incentives for men to use birth
control.1 It examines these problems in the context of exploring the ways
in which various "stories " ' or narratives about the family are generated
and used as society confronts changes in intimate behavior. The search for
incentives is undertaken as part of a contemporary reexamination of what
constitutes responsible male sexuality and fatherhood. It is only one aspect
of a much larger contemporary reconstruction of the traditional family
narrative in the wake of pressures generated by changing patterns of
behavior and altered expectations for the family as a social institution.
In contemporary society, it is no longer clear what constitutes
appropriate family role behavior-who is acting as a good mother or
father. In fact, it is no longer clear who or what constitutes a family. One
aspect of the reconstruction of the family narrative currently underway
involves the creation of a generic category of family
relationship-parenthood-from the previously differentiated roles of
mother and father and a corresponding redefinition of the social and
cultural understandings of fatherhood and its legal implications? This
reconstruction of the family narrative has been undertaken largely in
response to women resisting their historically assigned roles as wives and
mothers in the traditional family story.'
Changes quite often generate controversy and resistance. Traditional
stories are met with alternative visions and, as a result, are modified,
restated, and reintroduced into the ongoing debates. Ultimately, the
collected and conflicting stories we tell about families in our society reveal
* @Copyright by Martha A. Fineman 1993. Adrienne Hiegel imposed order to the
footnotes in this artile-a task for which she has gained my admiration and thanks.
** Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. This suggestion was an explicit part of the discussion in a "by invitation only"
seminar I attended in Washington, D.C., in the spring of 1992, sponsored by the
National Institute of Health.
2. See discussion infra part II.A.
3. See Martha L. Fineman, The NeuteredMother, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653, 660-

62 (1991).
4. See id. at 665.
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a great deal about how we view and understand the world in which we
operate.
Despite the existence of alternative stories, it is important to
remember that not all stories can be equally verified by empirical
observations. For example, the dominant spousal story for the past decade
has been one of equality; yet, there continues to be great gender inequality
in the allocation of the burdens and costs associated with reproduction.5
This difference is only one aspect of a much larger pattern of ingrained
and persistent gender inequality that characterizes the functioning of
intimate entities in our culture. The burdens associated with intimacy and
the maintenance of intimacy have always been disproportionately allocated
to women. Furthermore, 'given the cultural and market structures built
upon this fundamental division of family labor, this inequality is going to
be very difficult to change. If we were serious about redistributing these
burdens, it would require an ideological and structural reorientation of
society that does not seem likely to occur any time within the near future.
A final cautionary note is necessary to those prone to place too much
faith in the potential power of alternative stories. Even if one believes in
the possibility of change, it is unlikely that it will occur through legal
restructuring. Law is more reflective than constitutive of social realities,
tracking closely existing power alignments. Historically, real change has
been difficult to achieve. In particular, legal reforms in the area of
intimate relations have tended to be misdirected, addressing the wrong
questions and neglecting certain significant issues." This has resulted in
actions that reinforce, rather than alleviate, existing gender inequalities.
II. RETHINKING THE CONCEPT OF FAMILY
A. The Struggle over the Family
The retelling of family narratives is a process that deserves some
initial attention to put the reproduction and male-incentive story into
context. The contemporary family is a social and cultural construct with
multiple valuations. In recent years there have been significant shifts in the
5. See generally MARTHA A. FINMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE
RHEToRIC AND REALITY OF DIvORcE REFORM (1991) (noting that there have been
various backlashes generated by the women's movement's push for family and workplace
equality, including formation of fathers'-rights groups); VIcTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S
QUEST FOR EcONOMC EQUALITY (1988) (concluding that the constant conflict between

simultaneously maintaining family and career arises much more for women than for men,
persistently frustrating women's goal of attaining economic equality).
6. See Martha L. Fineman, Images ofMothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 274, 295.
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importance attached to the family as a cultural icon, as well as
reconsideration of it as a functional institution. It seems that family in our
society is viewed as such a simple and undisputed institution that a mere
reference to it serves as a full definition of widely shared values and
norms and, at the same time, as a complex, changing site of ongoing
struggle over basic ideological divisions in our society. 7
The family is an increasingly important object of study, however,
generating federal grants and volumes of sociological, psychological, and
political literature. The family is both overvalued on a symbolic and
metaphoric level and systematically devalued in terms of the allocation of
societal resources. A cultural and political schizophrenia exists about the
institution.8
Fundamental changes in the way many Americans organize their dayto-day family lives have contributed to that schizophrenia. Social
movements such as feminism and children's rights, organized in part to
bring the existence of the exploitive potential within traditional family
roles to political light, have set the stage for a collective reimagining of
the family.' As a result, there is a great deal of cultural negotiation
around the ways that we have traditionally organized intimacy in American
society.
The evolutionary dialogue associated with such negotiation reveals the
inescapably political (in the largest sense of that word) and ideological
nature of change. The arguments for and against change are largely
carried on through the use of stories or narratives, which are generated in
a variety of ways. These narratives come in multiple guises. They may be
cast as social science or case studies, illuminated and buttressed by
"scientific" or other designated objective means; framed as legislative or
judicial fact-finding, legitimated because it is asserted that they were
democratically produced within a stylized system of legal processes; or
merely selected for dramatization because it is recognized that they will
attract an audience when reported in the media or represented in fiction
7. See Martha A. Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the NaturalFamily, 23 CoNN. L.
REV. 955, 969 (1991).
8. See Susan M. Okin, Change in the Family: Change in the World, UTNE READER,
Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 74 (stating that the family in modem theory seems to be considered
as a background institution-the real focus being on the individual). A related
phenomenon is that typically any legal feminist who writes about the family has been cast
as a "cultural feminist" and marginalized as being primarily domestically oriented, even
if the focus of the analyses of the family is on concepts such as power and domination.
See Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits ofEqualiy, 24 GA. L. REV. 803, 835-38
(1990). See generally Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U.
Cm. LEGAL F. 59 (defending the choice of some feminists to discuss the law without
employing the framework suggested by critical social theorists).
9. See Fineman, supra note 7, at 969.
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or film." There may be different forms to the stories-some are horror
stories, others more like sentimental visions-but typically they seem to
offer both explanations for the status quo, as well as normative direction
for the future.
Rethinking the family has led to the discovery of ignored or
suppressed family stories. These alternative family stories become part of
the dialogue, more successfully embraced when confined to individuals
and defined as choosing a lifestyle. The acceptance and integration of the
changes on a general or a political level, however, have been impeded by
the political treatment of the family and its exploitation as a changing
institution in transition. In fact, the traditional stories gain potency in the
context of attack.
B. Fathers and Families
Rethinking the family on a grand scale is rightly recognized as a
significant ideological endeavor. The societal nature of this core institution
means that potential changes to it cannot be viewed in isolation from their
impact on other institutions. Belying the traditional dichotomy between,
public and private spheres is the assertion that if the family changes, so
will the market." There is unease with. the increasingly unavoidable
conclusion that there are no independent, unconnected choices."2
The family as an institution has historically served important practical
and ideological functions in our society. For centuries, it stood alone as
the formal and institutionalized manifestation of condoned sexual intimacy,
a cultural monopoly currently under attack. It has also operated as the
social institution in which the dependency of the very young and,
10. This list, by no means exhaustive, tacitly recognizes the validity of the postmodem claim that all texts are narrative and hence can be productively deconstructed.

11. See Fineman, supra note 3, at 661.
12. Increasingly, scholars and policymakers have recognized the relationship
between such "unconnected" issues as the divorce rate and the increase in applications
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the falseness of the dichotomy
between work and family. See generally LENORE J. WEnIAN, THE DIVORCE
REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN

AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). The grand rethinking of the "family," however, will

and must occur. The pressure of the growing numbers of untraditional families mandates
that such rethinking proceed. One interesting question will be how explicitly political or
ideological the rethinking will be. Many resist the application of ideological terms to
their personal experiences. Women who support equal rights in work and at home are

careful to indicate that they are not "feminists," and "alternative" families struggle to
analogize their same-sex or non-marital cohabitation situations with the traditional norm
of formal heterosexual marriage. See Fineman, supranote 7, at 969-72. People shun the
characterization of their behavior as deviant and seek the safety of normality.
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sometimes, the elderly and ill can be referred, confined, and thereby
hidden and ignored.13 The family functions as a complementary
institution to the state, alleviating it from direct economic responsibility
for its citizens.
These important social functions are premised on a division of labor
within the family. This division has historically confined women to the
private or family sphere, thus making them bear directly the burdens of
intimacy and dependency in our society. Men, as fathers and husbands,
have had the corresponding responsibility of economic support for the
family. This gendered division of labor has been the dominant casting
script for family stories. As more and more people are resisting their
assigned roles, however, society experiences the emergence of alternative
family narratives.
Fatherhood, for example, has certainly gained stature as more than a
mere biological classification with certain legal consequences. But, the
revised role must still be understood as an ideological construct implicated
in and fashioned by traditional power relationships within the institutions
of the family and the state. The historic organization and operative
assumptions about traditional family relationships obscured the statesanctioned power imbalance inherent in the family institution. The status
of father, husband, and head of household needed no formal explication
of the power the status held.
As adherence to the traditional family form has begun to wither away,
the complementary power relationships embedded in it had to be made
explicit to be preserved. New stories are fashioned. The emerging
alternative narratives, however, do not always challenge the basic
operation of the status quo.' In divorce law, newly wrought designations
of the rights and/or responsibilities associated with the status of spouse
and parent ensure that male control will survive the end of the marriage
relationship. Traditional assumptions, refashioned for a no-fault-divorce
world, are articulated as ongoing economic support obligations, along with
coerced access to, and control over, ex-wife and child.
The contemporary challenges to traditional patriarchal family forms,
however, are not limited to the divorce context. Divorce at least assumes
an initial adherence to traditional heterosexual formal marriage. There are
more profoundly deviant family forms gaining adherents and emerging as
fundamental challenges to the traditional narrative. Increasing numbers of
never-married women are becoming mothers, creating the perception of
a social "crisis" for family traditionalists in our society. To many
13. See Fineman, supra note 7, at 969-72.
14. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3, at 658 (providing an example of this in the
context of alterations, labeled "reforms," in the area of custody at divorce and povertylaw rules).
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observers of the contemporary scene, it seems clear that women are not
behaving as they should. Furthermore, many men seem to welcome the
reprieve from enforced economic responsibility for families. The old
roles are ignored.

m.

LEGAL INCENTIvES AND THE MORAL TALE
OF RESPONSIBLE FATHERHOOD

In recent years, as the institution of fatherhood has been transformed
on an ideological and rhetorical level, there has been a lot of popular and
political attention to the new man. Initially, the calls for change came from
a feminist community convinced that the ideals of sharing and equality
could be implemented in the family, as well as in the market context.
More recently, however, the portends of change are not feminist rhetoric,
but the statistically constructed stories of real-life mothering that seem to
call into question the continued relevance of traditional fatherhood. In its
extreme form, the new motherhood seems to reject men altogether. Many
more women are living large segments of their lives as single mothers.
The category of never-married mothers increases with each new
governmental report, causing alarm in some circles.15
An essential part of the never-married or newly single mothers' story
has become the failure of biological fathers to assume responsibility for
their offspring. Currently, there are considerations of the potential role of
the law in creating incentives for men to use contraception, pay child
support, and marry their children's mothers. Given that feminists and
liberal policymakers have long sought to distribute more evenly the
burdens associated with reproduction and child rearing, one might inquire,
"What is wrong with that goal?" I want to try to answer that question by
examining the implications of the search for ways to provide legal
incentives for male use of birth control and for exposing
16 the potential for
adding even more burdens to the load mothers carry.
A. Incentives and Punitive Potential
My basic concern with proposals for using law to encourage male
responsibility for birth control is that the question of how to provide
incentives inevitably will slip into a discussion of how to create
disincentives. This discussion will really be a debate about the appropriate
15. See Fineman, supranote 6, at 275 n.1; see also Fineman, supra note 3, at 665
(noting that the birth rate to unmarried women has increased continuously since 1980).
16. Other incentive proposals should be considered separately, although there are
common threads that accompany child-support and other single-mother tales in the stories
about irresponsible fathers.
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form of punishment for irresponsible reproduction. Furthermore, in regard
to reproductive issues, typically it is women who are punished, even in
those cases in which men were the initial focus of the
incentive-disincentive system.' 7 Perhaps this is due to an implicit
realization that, because of their "unique" position regarding reproduction,
women are likely to be more effective targets for coercive social policy
reforms.
Asking the wrong questions regarding incentives and reproduction in
areas other than contraception has meant that the issue of how best to
support women and children in society is relatively neglected. The concern
with child poverty in welfare debates, for example, is subsumed into the
debate on nomnarital reproduction and how to curtail it.
One basic problem with a consideration of incentives is that the wrong
issues are often addressed due to the inherent limitations of law and the
process of lawmaking. Law is a very crude instrument with which to
fashion and further social policy. For one thing, law is much better at
fashioning prohibitions and determining punishments than creating
affirmative incentives for behavior. In either case, whether developed to
structure incentives or to define punishments for certain behavior, law is
most effective when it tracks societal norms and values about which there
is strong agreement. 1'8 Attempts to use law to transform society by
imposing norms on an unreceptive population, however, are seldom
successful. 19

In addition, when societal norms are in a state of flux, as they
certainly are in relation to matters of sexual intimacy, contraception, and
reproductive rights, the law tends to be identified as a site of contest.
Warring societal factions seek to codify their world view, thereby giving
legitimacy to their stories about what are appropriate ideals and values.
Policy formation and law reform in this regard are political or, at least,
tend to develop in a politicized environment. This is significant because
it means that the lawmaking process often becomes a highly charged,
symbolic endeavor. In such instances, the explicit subject matter under
consideration is merely the tip of a larger, ideologically potent iceberg.
The political nature of policy formation also means that lawmaking occurs
in the context of compromise and conciliation, activities that may
undermine specific, controlled steps in a well-considered strategy to
accomplish certain goals. Furthermore, it is important to remember that
quite often the weaker, underrepresented members of society-women,
children, and the poor-are those whose interests are first sacrificed in the
17. Cf. Fineman, supranote 6, at 294-95.
18. See Fineman, supra note 3, at 662.
19. See id.
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spirit of compromise, or whose version of the story is never heard in the

first place.
These warnings about the nature of law are relevant in considering
how skeptical we should be about the quest for legal incentives for male
use of contraception. In the abstract, such an endeavor may be
worthwhile, but, because incentive has tended historically to be perceived
and implemented as punishment,' we should be concerned about the

ultimate punitive possibilities of any specific incentive-directed outcomes.
B. Men Who Are Cast as Responsible Reproducers

The focus on incentives for men is shaped by and reflective of a story
laden with values and norms about the appropriate contexts for
reproduction that needs further exploration and refinement. Regarding the
question of existing incentives, for example, the fundamental premise of
the reproduction story seems to be that women have a natural incentive to
use birth control because the context of their decision making is defined

by the potential for pregnancy and the resulting social role they will play
as mothers. For men, however, the incentive must be artificially
manufactured through the creation of economic consequences using the
legal system.
The conclusion that legal changes are necessary to provide contextual
incentives for men, as an undifferentiatedgroup, to use birth control is not
an obvious one for someone familiar with existing family law and policy.
Because of the existing, well-established set of legal obligations that
adhere to the marital status, a more careful consideration reveals a
reproductive story in which men are divided into two distinct categories
with regard to the incentive question.2 1 Some men are responsible
20. See JAMEs Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 118 (1983) (stating that "[t]o
a psychologist, deterring persons from committing crimes or inducing persons toengage
in noncriminal activities are but special cases of using 'reinforcements' (or rewards) to
alter behavior"); see also HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF TH CRIMINAL
SANCnON 37-39 (1968). For Packer, the notion of retribution is also significant as an
underlying rationale for deterrence arguments for sanctions. Although atonement through
suffering has historically been a major theme in religious thought, it doubtless plays a
role in thought about secular punishment as well. The retribution view of punishment
shifts the emphasis from deterrence to demands that the criminal take it upon himself or
herself to become reconciled with the social order. Id. It is precisely this notion of
punishment for failure to conform to the social order that this article explores.
21. This process of categorization is consistent with much of the "we/them"
distinction that characterizes criminal law. Commentators differ on the degree of
"difference" between normal and criminal individuals. For example, James Wilson has
stated that
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potential reproducers, while others are not. The legal institution of
marriage provides the context of responsibility for some men. Men who
are neatly and securely tied to the nuclear family by marriage have plenty
of legal and economic incentives to plan families-to engage in responsible
reproduction.
The incentives that married men experience in regard to reproduction
are not biologically compelled. They are derivatively compelled, however,
because the status of being married ties the economic future of husbands
to their wives' reproductive fortunes. It is well known that married men
are legally responsible for child support, an obligation that extends beyond
the marital tie should there be a divorce. Therefore, from a policy
perspective, married men can be comfortably presumed to be responsible
reproducers, not in need of further incentives regarding birth control.
Married men's reproductive potential is contained and contextualized
within an institution that has well-defined legal expectations and
obligations for them and their relationship to their children.
Of course, it could be that, as a policy matter, we are not satisfied by
the incentive for male participationin decision making about contraception
that marriage provides. Some policymakers may want to use law to
enhance male control over reproduction in the nuclear-family context.
Perhaps some people feel that men would make better, more responsible
decisions about reproduction than women do. A few men have expressed
dismay about their perception that men have lost control (or perhaps they
never had control) over reproduction.' These men believe that women
unfairly exercise a monopoly over the reproductive decision.' This
attitude is reflected in the rhetoric of spokesmen for several men's rights
groups who strongly endorsed the idea of an oral male contraceptive
because, as Dan Logan, Executive Director of the men's rights group Free
Men stated:
[W]e always treat reproductive rights as a women's subject and
something they control[.] I think the fact that women carry a
to assert that "deterrence doesn't work" is tantamount to either denying the
plainest facts of everyday life or claiming that would-be criminals are utterly
different from the rest of us. They may well be different to some degree-they
most likely have a weaker conscience, worry less about their reputation in
polite society, and find it harder to postpone gratifying their urges-but these
differences of degree do not make them indifferent to the risks and gains of
crime.
WILSON, supra note 20, at 119.
22. See Jean Marbella, Men Offer Mixed Opinions on Male Birth ControlPill, L.A.
TIMES, May 14, 1990, at E3.

23. See id.
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womb in their body is an accident of biology. It could just as
easily have been men. We have just as much at stake in
reproductive subjects as women do. 4
In addition, Fredric Hayward, executive director of Men's Rights,
Inc. believes it is important for men to get equal access to better
contraceptive options because under the current system of reproductive
roles, men have been excluded from full parenthood. He stated that a
woman's "[i]dea that, 'It's my body, I'm bearing the risk, therefore I'm
the one who will make the decisions,' that's the female chauvinism version
of men who think women shouldn't have the vote because they weren't the
ones who fought in the fields to get democracy ... "I
In regard to the desire to increase married men's participation and
control in the reproductive area, it is interesting to note that one of the
issues of first impression in the Pennsylvania abortion case, recently
decided by the Supreme Court, was spousal notification.' The Third
Circuit recognized that existing Supreme Court doctrine precluded viewing
any requirement of spousal notification as an expression of the State's
interest in protecting a husband's interest in a pre-viable fetusY The
judges determined that what the Pennsylvania legislature must have sought
to preserve was something considerably more modest-the preservation for
the husband of "the possibility ofparicipating in a decision his wife is
constitutionally privileged to make on her own for her own reasons."'
For the Third Circuit, this possibility did not constitute the kind of
compelling state interest that could justify substantial burdens on the wife's
right to abortion.'
Although a majority of the Supreme Court ultimately agreed on the
impermissibility of spousal notification, I one thing that remains apparent
is that segments of society are very concerned with protecting a role for
married men regarding abortion.3 ' Furthermore, this concern may be
gaining adherents. One of the dissenting Third Circuit judges in Casey
24. Id. (quoting Dan Logan, Executive Director, Free Men).
25. Id. (quoting Fredric Hayward, Executive Director, Men's Rights, Inc.)
26. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
27. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 709-15 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
28. Id. at 715 (emphasis added).
29. See id.
30. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2796.
31. See Kay Miller, How Do MarriedMen Feel About Ruling on Abortion?, STAR
TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 6, 1992, at IE.
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stated that the Court had already determined that
a man has a fundamental interest in preserving his ability to father
a child.....
[A] husband who is willing to participate in raising
a child has a fundamental interest in the child's welfare ... It
follows that a husband has a "legitimate" interest in the welfare
of a fetus he has conceived with his wife.... This interest may

be legitimately furthered by state legislation . .. The
Pennsylvania legislature could have rationally believed that some
married women are initially inclined to obtain an abortion without
their husbands' knowledge because of perceived problems-such

as economic constraints, future plans, or the husbands' previously
expressed opposition-that may be obviated by discussion prior
to the abortion.'
C. The Tale of the Irresponsible Reproducer
While furthering male control over reproductive decisions made in the
context of marriage may be of some concern, most law-reform efforts
have focused on controlling the conduct of the unmarried man, presumed
to be an irresponsible potential reproducer.'

It is with regard to this

group of men that the reason for the use of law in the search for
incentives becomes clear. Recent changes in the law are attempts to

replicate the derivative incentives for reproductive responsibility that
marriage provides-to tie legally the father to the mother and the child.
While the paternity proceeding, the particular device to accomplish this
32. Casey, 947 F.2d at 725-26 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. See generally GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMmRCE, SERIES P-60,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989 (listing the
statistics, according to demographics, of alimony and child-support awards). This
presumption about differentiated responsibility has concrete implications. Unmarried
fathers are not held to the same economic standards as married fathers, even by courts.
As of 1989, for example, the child-support award rate for never-married mothers was
24%, while the rate for ever-married mothers, by contrast, was 72%, or three times that
of never-married women. Of the women due child support, the percentages of women
who received some payments in 1989 were not significantly different for the two
groups-72% of never-married mothers entitled to it received some support, while about
73% of ever-married mothers received payments. Id. at 6. The mean child-support
amount differed greatly, however, depending on status. In 1989, divorced women
received a mean child-support payment of $3,268, while the payments to never-married
women averaged $1,888. Id. at 7. Such differences undoubtedly contribute to the high
rate of never-married women who live below the poverty level (53.9%). Id. at 2.
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goal, has been with us a long time, recent measures greatly increase its
use and direct its consequences.'
Theoretically, through the paternity proceeding, irresponsible
reproducers are burdened with the same economic and legal consequences
that men within traditional marriage relationships would have. The logic
is that they will then have the same incentive to be responsible. The use
of the term incentive in this context, however, is disingenuous. To a great
extent, the social policy search is really for an effective deterrent for
irresponsible potential reproducers. In this case, therefore, the legal
response should be viewed as creating disincentives or punishment
-punitive responses to socially unacceptable behavior and its
consequences.
A punitive model is consistent with history. At common law, criminal
sanctions were imposed for indulgence in nonmarital sex. 5 Disincentives
for irresponsible reproduction included bastardy proceedings and the use
of the criminal process to coerce marriage by designating marriage as a
defense to criminal proceedings for fornication or nonmarital
cohabitation.' Such starkly punitive responses seem out-of-date in our
more sexually permissive era. But while most states have abolished
criminal regulation of nonmarital heterosexual relations, noncriminal
consequences exist that are still enforced by the legal system. The criminal
process has been replaced with civil proceedings that assign financial
responsibility for nonmarital children, thereby coupling the single mothers'
economic needs with presumed economically viable fathers. Theoretically
these fathers will assume the financial obligations for their nonnarital
children.
34. See infra part III.D.
35. See generally Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns ofBehavior: The
Sanctions on Non-Marital Cohabitation, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 275, 278-80 (stating that in
Wisconsin, criminal prohibition on cohabitation without formal marriage dates back to
1839).
36. See Hendrik Hartog, 7he Public Law of a County Court: JudicialGovernment
in 18th Century Massachusetts, 20 AM. J. LE AL HIST. 282,299-300 (1976). Fornication
accounted for over 40% of prosecutions in a Massachusetts court in the 18th century.
The number of men and married women prosecuted for fornication fell after 1740, and
it was primarily single women who were brought before the court on charges of criminal
fornication in the latter half of the century. Men continued, however, to be sued for
bastardy. Id.
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D. Paternity Proceedings:
Transformation of Irresponsible Reproduction
The paternity proceeding is typically classified as civil in nature; yet,

it is viewed by many public-interest advocates as akin to a criminal
trial.Y The imposition of a child-support award is considered to be the
equivalent of an eighteen-year sentence.3 There are constant efforts to
secure criminal-process-type protections for putative fathers in these
proceedings, such as the right to counsel, the imposition of higher burdens
of proof, and other reforms." Paternity proceedings, from a State's

perspective, however, are far more remedial than punitive in nature.
Perhaps most significantly, they are for the purpose of restitution-to

restore to the State public funds expended on the nonmarital child.'
The frequency ofpaternity proceedings, prompted by state and federal

reforms, has greatly increased during the past several years. Reliance on
this process is an essential step in assuring private or family responsibility
for children, and it has been a mainstay of recent welfare reforms. These
reforms seek to ensure that children are firmly anchored financially,
morally, and legally to a father. Cynically, one might observe that the
paramount welfare reform objective of paternity actions is letting the State
off the41economic hook by substituting paternal-support obligation for State

funds.

37. See Mark D. Esterle, Indigents in PaternityActions, 24 J. FAM. L. 1, 9-10

(1985).
38. Seeid. at3.
39. See Victoria S. Williams & Robert G. Williams, Identifying Daddy: The Role
of the Courts in Establishing Paternity, 28 JUDGEs' J. 2, 3 (1989). The criminal roots
of paternity proceedings may account for the complex procedures that attend the process.
Some states continue to use criminal terminology, such as "arraignment" and "paternity
warrant," in the judicial processing of paternity cases. Id; see also Reynolds v.
Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 801 (Alaska 1977) (finding that although paternity proceedings
will not result in immediate incarceration, a parent of a child under 16 who intentionally
fails to provide support may be held criminally liable).
40. See generally Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed:Limits of Private
Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1990) (exploring the mounting
tension between "(1) society's continuing need for a functioning family infrastructure,
(2) the modem 'Me Generation's' emphasis on individual's rights ... , (3) traditional
financial responsibility for dependents.. . , and (4) the care-giving capacity of the one
parent family"); Williams & Williams, supra note 39, at 3. Only a small fraction of
paternity establishment cases are brought to the court by private plaintiffs. Id.
41. See Hartog, supranote 36, at 302. It is interesting to note that early fornication
prosecutions served a similar purpose. Because most New England towns had the right
after 1758 to bind into servitude any woman with an illegitimate child who refused to
reimburse or "procure the reimbursement" for the public expense of raising the child,
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The objective of paternity proceedings is the creation of a legal tie

between the single father and the dependent single mother and child.
Unlike the consensual nature of the relationship between a married couple,

neither the mother's nor the father's wishes regarding the establishment
of such a tie are considered relevant. This tie is essential for the incentive
or sanction of child support to apply in a nonmarital situation.
Child support as a sanction for irresponsible reproduction
(reproduction outside of marriage) is part of the structure of the Family
Support Act of 1988 (FSA), 2 the first major legislation addressing
fornication prosecutions became a method of forcing women to name the putative father
in an effort to obtain support. The fornication prosecutions ultimately functioned as an
administrative procedure to reallocate the costs of illegitimacy. Id.
42. See Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1988)). Subtitle A, entitled "Child Support" provides in § 101
that the wages of an absent parent shall be subject to withholding in enforcing payment
of child-support orders and that the Secretary of Health and Human Services will conduct
a study to determine the feasibility of requiring immediate income withholding of all
child-support awards in a state. Exceptions are allowed when both parties agree to other
arrangements or when one party shows good cause. Id. § 101, 102 Stat. at 2344-45.
Section 102 clarifies that a family receiving public assistance will not have the first
$50 of each month's child-support payment counted against their entitlement, even if that
payment is made more than once in a single month; e.g., payments made for prior
months. Id. § 102, 102 Stat. at 2346.
Section 103 provides that the state must establish support payment guidelines and
that there must be a judicial "rebuttable presumption" that such guidelines are correct.
This presumption may be overcome by showing that enforcement of such standards
would be "unjust or inappropriate in a particular case." Id. § 103, 102 Stat. at 2346-48,
Subtitle C, entitled "Improved Procedures for Child Support Enforcement and
Establishment of Paternity," provides various standards for States' support enforcement
mechanisms. It provides that States must establish time limits for response to requests for
investigations and time limits by which payments must be made of support money
collected by the State. Section 123 requires that States have either automated data
processing and information retrieval systems or a system that the State can show is
equivalent. Id. § 123, 102 Stat. at 2352-53.
Section 125 provides that "each State shall require each parent to furnish to such
State... the social security account number issued to the parent unless the State (in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) finds good cause for not
requiring the furnishing of such number." Id. § 125, 102 Stat. at 2353-54.
Section 126 established the Commission on Interstate Child Support, which makes
recommendations to Congress for improving interstate child support and holds at least
one conferenceon interstate child supportto assist in formulating these recommendations.
Id. § 126, 102 Stat. at 2354-55.
Section 128 requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
conduct a study of the patterns of expenditures on children in two-parent
families, in single-parent families following divorce or separation, and in
single-parent families in which the parents were never married, giving
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poverty to pass Congress in several decades. The FSA reflects the belief
that welfare dependency is a significant problem requiring dramatic
reorientation of welfare policy.' Provisions of the FSA mandate stricter
particular attention to the relative standards of living in households in which
both parents and all of the children do not live together.
Id. § 128, 102 Stat. at 2356. The Secretary is also required to submit policy
recommendations based on this study. Id.
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988). The primary objective seems to be the insertion
of welfare recipients into the workforce. This is accomplished for the single mother
either by mandating her to work or train for work and/or by substituting the employed
father as the child's primary source of support instead of the State. The new legislation's
focus on reinforcing the work ethic and dominant individualistic norms of self-sufficiency
through the imposition of "workfare" provisions for mothers of young children has been
the major emphasis of most commentators. The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
(JOBS) component of the reform legislation represents the latest instance in the long
history of welfare to promote work and discourage welfare dependency among the poor.
Most often the term "workfare" has been reserved for the requirement that recipients
work off their benefits, usually by accepting some form of public or community work
assignment. The JOBS program has been called the "new workfare" in that, while
requiring work, it also offers opportunities for education, job training, skill development,
job counseling, and placement in the private sector, along with other support services
such as extended child care and health insurance. Fineman, supranote 6, at 277 n.4. The
JOBS program, then, is workfare with support services. The JOBS program replaces the
Work Incentive Program (WIN), 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1967), which was initiated in 1967.
See Fineman, supra note 6, at 277 n.4.
Prior to the passage of the Family Support Act, policy discussions emphasized
research that highlighted the effectiveness of "new workfare" programs in moving people
from welfare to work. See JuDrrH M. GUERON, REFORMING WELFARE WiTH WORK
(Occasional Paper Number Two, Ford Foundation Project on Social Welfare and the
American Future, 1987); LAwRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT (1986) (stressing
that low-cost programs emphasizing work requirements as a general norm are costefficient and likely to provide considerable movement from welfare to work); Lawrence
M. Mead, The PotentialforWork Enforcement: A Study of WI, 7 J. POL. ANALYSIS &
MoMT. 264 (1988). But see Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, The Real Welfare
Problem, 1 AM. PROSPECr 31 (1990). Increased employment through workfare
programs, however, was hardly a solution to the poverty problems of poor, femaleheaded families if we take into account the earnings needed by these families to get out
of poverty. Mothers in these particular families would, on average, need jobs that pay
in the vicinity of two to three times the minimum wage before they could be reasonably
expected to leave welfare and meet their expenses, including child and health care.
The essence of the so-called "welfare trap" is not that welfare warps women's
personalities or makes them pathologically dependent, though that may
occasionally happen. The essence of the "trap" is that while welfare pays
badly, low-wage jobs pay even worse. Most welfare mothers are quite willing
to work if they end up with significantly more disposable income as a result.
But they are not willing to work if working will leave them as poor as they
were when they stayed home.
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enforcement of child-support orders, including wage withholding.
While federal provisions help collect support from divorced fathers,
thereby insuring continuation of responsible reproduction, it is in relation
to unmarried men that major efforts were undertaken. States are required
to meet federal standards for establishing paternity for children born out
of wedlock as a means of obtaining child support from absent fathers."
The provisions mandating paternity proceedings reflect the idea of
responsible reproduction and, by legally tying the father to the
mother-child unit, reinforce traditional norms of male economic
responsibility for children that are typically expressed in the context of the
nuclear family.
The political rhetoric surrounding the reforms evidences the assumed
desirability of the traditional family form. In addressing the FSA in the
Senate, for example, Senator Moynihan began his comments by
commending President Bush for his remarks at the United Nations World
Summit for Children. Senator Moynihan stated that
[o]ne sentence [of Bush's remarks is] especially notable. "We
want to see the day when every American child is part of a strong
and stable family." The importance of this statement is elemental.
Unlike the problems of children in much of the world, age-old
problems of disease, new problems of ecological disaster, the
problems of children in the United States are overwhelmingly

All these calculations lead inexorably to one conclusion. An unskilled
single mother cannot expect to support herself and her children in today's labor
market either by working or by collecting welfare. If she wants to make ends
meet, she must either get help from someone else (usually an absent father,
parent, or boyfriend) or she must combine work and welfare. At present, the
only way she can combine work and welfare is to collect AFDC and then work
without telling the welfare department.
Id. at 43-45.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(A) (1988). The FSA imposes standards of compliance
on the States, requiring that, as of 1991, each State's "paternity establishment percentage
for such fiscal year equals or exceeds" a requisite amount. The "paternity establishment
percentage" is the ratio of the total number of children born out of wedlock who are
receiving some form of public assistance and for whom paternity has been established,
to the total number of children born out-of-wedlock who are receiving some sort of
public assistance. This section also requires the child and all other parties in contested
paternity cases to submit to genetic tests, except where good cause has been shown that
this is not in the best interest of the child. Those not in receipt of AFDC may be charged
for such tests. The statute encourages the State to adopt simple civil procedures for
voluntary acknowledgement of paternity and for establishing paternity in civil cases. Pub.
L. No. 100-485, § 111(a), 102 Stat. at 2348-50 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 652(g)(2)(A)
(1988)).
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associated with the strength and stability of their families. Our
problems do not reside in nature, nor yet are they fundamentally
economic. Our problems derive from behavior."
Having established his basic premise, Moynihan continued that

[t]here is a mountain of scientific .evidence showing that when
families disintegrate, children often end up with intellectual,

physical, and emotional scars that persist for life .... We talk
about the drug crisis, the education crisis, and the problems of
teen pregnancy and juvenile crime. But all these ills trace back

predominantly to one source: broken families.'
Moynihan's rhetoric, which attributes the problems of the poor to
their own behavior, tracks the simplistic tendency in poverty discourses

to categorize mothers negatively-single mothers and their children seem
to be cast as merely a by-product of the real concern that is male

irresponsibility.
IV. SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE "COSTS" OF RESPONSIBILITY

The connection between irresponsibility and marital status is even
more explicit in the stories told in the recently enacted welfare reforms in
New Jersey.47 The New Jersey reform has two basic thrusts. First, it
encourages marriage formation by creating economic incentives, thereby
demonstrating a preference for responsible family formation. Married
45. 136 CONG. REC. S14,416 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(quoting President George Bush).
46. 136 CONG. REc. S14,418 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(introducing to the record an article by Sen. Moynihan); see also 134 CoNG. REc. S7730
(daily ed. June 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Specter) (discussing the hand-in-hand
relationship between poverty and crime, and the need to reform welfare from a hand-out
to a hand-up system); 134 CONG. REc. S4712 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Cochran) (discussing the need to reform the welfare program from a system of
reliance to a ladder of self-dependency, calling for requirements that all able-bodied
welfare recipients work and that absent fathers pay child support, thus strengthening
family cohesion); 134 CONG. REC. S3069 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 1988) (statement of Sen
Cochran) (noting that two-thirds of those classified as "poor" are single mothers and
children, resulting in their long-term dependence on public assistance).
47. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44:10-19, -20 (West Supp. 1992) The statute's purpose
is to go beyond economic aid to the recipient alone by offering the recipient assistance
in obtaining higher academic and vocational training.
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couples would be allowed to live together without losing a portion of their
welfare benefits, as would have happened under the earlier law.'
Second, the reform both escalates and defuses the punishment or
sanctions for irresponsible reproduction. The sanctions are justified by the
rhetorical linking of reforms in public assistance with the assumption of
personal responsibility. The punitive paternity proceeding is present, 9 of
course, but the legislation goes further than this in its imposition of
sanctions. Mothers and children are directly punished by the removal of
economic incentives for irresponsible reproduction. The new statute denies
a sixty-four-dollar monthly increase for each additional child born into a
welfare family. 50
As the New Jersey reforms indicate, the logic behind economic
incentives in conjunction with reproduction ultimately leads to sanctions
(disguised as incentives) on the single mother and her child. Justification
for the escalation and expansion of disincentives is couched in terms of
incentives-translated into an attempt at weaning 1people off welfare by
forcing them to "be responsible for their actions."'
In fact, it may be that even if fathers are also a source of concern, the
mothers' behavior is more easily brought within the incentives
conceptualization, simply because they are the ones who actually give
birth and assume care for the children. The State of Maryland recently
announced welfare reforms designed to reduce benefits for welfare
mothers who fail to exhibit responsible behavior regarding their children's
school attendance and health care.52 In California, Governor Wilson's
deputy press secretary commented on reforms to limit or deny aid if a
variety of behaviors, including having additional children, were engaged
in by welfare mothers: "We're not asking them to get off aid and seek a
40 hour-a-week job; we're asking [the welfare mother] to start taking
responsibility for [her] life, to do something positive and constructive to
increase self-esteem, to go out and start earning on [her] own."'
Even liberal commentators, such as Irwin Garfinkel of the Institute for
Poverty Research, have concluded that it is the potential for maternal
deterrence or incentive that is relevant to welfare reforms. He stated that
the problem with providing more aid to single-parent families is that doing
so creates incentives for the formation and preservation of single-parent
48. See id. § 44:10-3.5.
49. See id. § 44:4-1.04.
50.
51.
at A13.
52.
53.

See id.
Paul Taylor, CarrotsandSticks of Welfare Reform, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1992,
See Julie Kosterlitz, Behavior Modification, NAT'L J., Feb. 1, 1992, at 271.
Id. (quoting James Lee).
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families. Garfinkel, unlike some conservative commentators, recognizes
that single-mother families may not be all bad:
Of course, it is possible that society is better off-or at least no
worse off-as a result of whatever additional single-parent
families are created by more favorable treatment of those groups.
Not all marriages are made in heaven. Some men beat their wives
and children .... In some of these cases, all the parties may be
better off separate rather than together.'
Nonetheless, he concludes that "[d]espite the fact that increases in single
parenthood may not be socially pernicious, prudence would suggest that
in the face of ignorance we should seek to minimize incentives for single
parenthood."'
If it is in fact easier to structure arguments for incentives directed at
mothers because they will be considered potentially more effective, this
is likely to produce more mean-spirited and parsimonious reforms like
those in New Jersey. As a political matter, these women and their children
are the weakest members of society, the most dependent, and the least
immediately dangerous. And, if contraception fails, punishment seems to
be ideologically justified in contemporary welfare rhetoric.
There is a second concern, however, about the potential for the use
of law to provide economic incentives for male use of birth control. Even
if incentives or reforms are conceived of as exclusively aimed at fathers,
they will inevitably affect mothers negatively as a group.
This negative effect on mothers is the reason paternity proceedings
raise concern. For instance, aspects of the process itself are objectionable.
Single mothers lose their privacy.' They are asked questions about their
54. Irwin Garfinkel, The Role of Child Support in Anti-Poverty Policy, Institute for
Research on Poverty, Discussion Paper #713-82, at 12 (1982) (unpublished paper, on file

with the author).
55. Id.
56. To support an alleged father's denial of paternity at a contested hearing,
attorneys will often subpoena all men with whom the woman had sexual relations during
the period in question. See Stenzel v. Bennett, 374 N.Y.S.2d 175 (App. Div. 1975)
(using the testimony of the petitioner's landlord regarding the number of men going in
and out of her apartment helped cast doubt on the asserted paternity of the child by
inferring sexual relations with other men); Russo v. Hardy, 328 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889
(Fam. Ct. 1972) (finding that social-services records concerning statements made by the
mother about her relations with men are admissible). But see Margaret B. v. Gilbert W.,
382 N.Y.S.2d 306 (App. Div. 1976) (illustrating that the intrusiveness of the hearing to
the putative father may be significantly less and that answers to interrogatories by the
alleged father and income-tax records may not be admissible at a hearing), rev'd, 363
N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1977).
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including

incarceration. 57 Benefits may be withheld if they refuse to cooperate. 58
It is the mothers, and ultimately the children, who are now, and will
continue to be, sanctioned in pursuit of incentives for male responsibility
for birth control. Not only will single mothers lose their privacy, but also

many will find themselves exposed to possible violence and abuse as a
result of the establishment of an unwanted paternity tie." Furthermore,
there may be other long-term implications because along with paternity
obligations come visitation rights and, perhaps, claims for custody.'
Even non-AFDC61 single mothers are vulnerable to the sanctioning
resulting from this incentive-conferring process. In Wisconsin, for
example, under a rhetorical bludgeon that dictates that every child has a
right to a father or at least to a father's name on a birth certificate,

legislation has been passed that requires all single mothers to participate
in paternity proceedings.62 These proceedings are mandated even if the

State is not likely to be asked to become a source of economic support for
the child. The major architect of the legislation has stated that
[w]e have now in Wisconsin a- law that I authored that will

become the model for the nation regarding paternity. It has as its
foundation that every child born in Wisconsin has a legal right to
a father. Children without legal fathers have started down a
slippery slope that leads to poverty. Our new paternity law is a
57. See Fineman, supra note 6, at 295.
58. See Tomas v. Rubin, 926 F.2d 906,910 (9th Cir.), clarifiedon denialofreh'g,
935 F.2d 1555 (9th Cir. 1991). The requirement of cooperation may include the
willingness to: talk, provide information, give complete answers, maintain a pleasant
tone, and give the names of others who can provide information regarding the absentee
parent. The requirement may also include friendliness, interest, sincerity, and the
maintenance of eye contact.
59. See, e.g., Waller v. Carlton Co. Hum. Servs. Dep't, No. C6-89-1116, 1989
WL 145393 (Minn. Ct. App. Dee. 5, 1989). The court denied a request of the good
cause exception to the cooperation requirement in light of anticipated physical and
emotional abuseto the applicant. The court held that the mother had failed to substantiate
her allegation that the child was the product of rape with legal documentation. The
applicant had, however, presented affidavits from her social worker and a friend attesting
to the violent nature of the putative father. Id.
60. See Helen Donigan, CalculatingandDocunentingChild SupportAwards Under
WashingonLaw, 26 GoNz. L. REv. 13, 20 (1990). In a survey of Washington attorneys
and judges, 61% of attorneys and 71% of judges indicated that women may trade lower
child support in exchange for a promise not to contest custody. See id.
61. See Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1988).
62. See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.45-.53 (West 1988).
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radical departure in that the interests of the child will become
equal if not paramount to the interests of the natural parents. The
law seeks to ensure that at the time of birth the state and the
mother will pursue, for non-marital birth, the establishment of
paternity and the subsequent collection of support.
But the philosophy of the law is not punitive. Rather, it
assumes that families are natural and that it is not appropriate to
have laws that have as their result that in one out of every two
births outside of marriage the child will have no legal
father-paternity will never be established.
Under our new law the birth certificate will be the vehicle to
establish paternity early on. A presumption of paternity will be
created with the filing of a statement. It will go with the birth
certificate in most cases when the baby leaves the hospital. It will
provide the basis for courts to order child support. But most
important, it will give that child a legal father.
Both our child support law and our new paternity law are
designed to ensure parental responsibility and to help families
form and most importantly give new rights to children.'
The legislator seems unconcerned that the mother's cooperation,
which will require her to reveal details of her sexual and personal life,
will be compelled under the potential sanction of incarceration by use of
the contempt power. Nor does he take note of the fact that the legal
father's paternal involvement with the child will not be mandated by the
court beyond, perhaps, payment of child support. Also absent is any
mention of the fact that a legal father can exercise legal rights, becoming
an unwanted, perhaps abusive, presence in the mother's and child's lives
merely because he fathered the child.'
V.

CONCLUSION-THE META-NARRATIVE:
THE PRIVATIZATION OF INTIMACY

The story of responsible reproduction and the role of incentives has
significant social consequences that are perhaps even more important than

the potential for individual harm. The focus on paternity proceedings
designed to tie men to single mothers and their children financially is a

moral to the story, which has significant ideological implications. Most
important is that it obscures the magnitude and dimensions of the
63. Speaker Tom Loftus of the Wisconson State Legislature, Remarks at the
National Child Support Enforcement Association, New Orleans, La. (Aug. 23, 1988) (on

file with the author).
64. See Fineman, supra note 6, at 294-95.
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economic deprivations that make it difficult for women who make
decisions to reproduce or to raise their children.' Rather than addressing
the needs of existing single mothers, disincentive reforms take the form
of either punishing them for reproducing or pushing them into a nuclear
family form-a model of family life increasingly discredited, even in the
middle class from which it "arose.
A legal anthropologist might view the paternity proceeding as a ritual.
The State, in its orchestration and performance of the proceeding,
reinforces, recreates, and reiterates several fundamental societal values.
Paramount among these is, of course, the strong preference for formally
celebrated heterosexual marriage as the core social unit upon which all
else is founded. This preference places responsible reproduction within the
context of the traditional family-a context in which the legal
consequences are clear aid the decisions will be considered and
controlled.
For far too long and to too great an extent, family policy in this
country has been fashioned and formulated with this dominant ideological
construct in mind. The nuclear-family ideal, and the policy based on it,
foster the assumption that the maintenance of intimacy, from contraception
to responsibility for the day-to-day care of children, is primarily a private
task. Intimacy and the costs it generates are placed within the confines of
the traditional family structure-a unit that is self-sufficient, and
independent, in which independent gender roles function to assure
reproduction and nurturing. This type of thinking has allowed the
withdrawal of governmental assistance from all families in the past
decade, not only the poor.
65. See LFsTER, supra note 33, at 7. Of all women living with children under 21
years of age whose father is not living in the household, only 58% were awarded child-

support payments. Id. at 10. Only about half of these women received the full amount
of payments they were due, leaving 32% of all such families below the poverty level. Id.
at 1. Of the 4.2 million women who were never awarded child-support payments, 64%
wanted an award but did not obtain one. Id. at 10. Furthermore, there is significant
doubt whether the provisions of the reforms are effective measures of increasing childsupport payments from absent fathers. The detailed requirements for wage withholding
call for accurate records; when the forms were enacted, States were faced with large
backlogs of delinquent cases which "compounded startup problems." Id. Delays in States'
institution of wage withholding, in approval of federal funding for automated childsupport systems, and in the issuing of federal guidelines for the systems have contributed
to a low rate of collection of payment under the reforms. Eighty-one percent of advocates
questioned indicated that enforcement of payment through use of liens was "poor," and
used phrases like "never done," "non-existent," and "refuses to do this" when
commenting on these provisions. In one case, an advocate was told by the IV-D agency
that personnel did not know the procedure for enforcing payment through liens.
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For these reasons, the idea of using law to provide incentives for male
use of birth control presents difficulties. It seems to be that the logic of
this particular reproductive story will inevitably contribute to the creation
and furtherance of associated myths about the idealized private family and
its relationships that should be challenged. The stories we are telling about
our families, whether traditional or reconfigured, continue to justify
sanctions and punitive reforms that create disadvantages for women and
children.

